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Abstract  4 
 5 
With the problems of doping in sport becoming more serious, the World Anti-6 
Doping Code was drafted by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 2003 and 7 
became effective one year later. Since its passage, the Code has been renewed four 8 
times, with the fourth and the latest version promulgated in January, 2015. The Code 9 
was intended to tackle the problems of doping in sports through cooperation with 10 
governments to ensure fair competition as well as the health of athletes. To 11 
understand China’s strategies for managing compliance with the Code and also the 12 
implications behind those strategies, this study borrows ideas from theories of 13 
compliance. China’s high levels of performance in sport, judged by medal success, 14 
have undoubtedly placed the country near the top of the global sports field. Therefore, 15 
how China acts in relation to international organizations, and especially how it 16 
responds to WADA, is highly significant for the future of elite sport and for the 17 
world anti-doping regime. In response to WADA, China developed strategies related 18 
to seven institutional factors: ‘monitoring’, ‘verification’, ‘horizontal linkages’, 19 
‘nesting’, ‘capacity building’, ‘national concern’ and ‘institutional profile’. As for 20 
the implications, the Chinese government is willing and able to comply with the 21 
WADA Code. In other words, the Chinese government is willing to pay a high price 22 
in terms of money, manpower and material resources so that it can recover from the 23 
disgrace suffered as a result of doping scandals in the 1990s. The government wants 24 
to ensure that China’s prospects as a participant, bidder and host of mega-sporting 25 
event are not compromised, especially as the host of the 2022 Winter Olympics in 26 
Beijing.  27 
 28 
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Introduction 1 
 2 
The Olympic motto ‘Faster, Higher, Stronger’ is intended to encourage athletes to 3 
continue participating in sport, to strive for excellence and to seek personal bests. These 4 
goals, however well-intentioned, can motivate some athletes to use substances to 5 
enhance their performance when disappointing results might adversely affect their 6 
social status, monetary pay-offs or other forms of rewards (Houlihan, 2002a, 2002b). A 7 
winning-obsessed culture has led to numerous tragedies with athletes dying while 8 
competing due to the effects of doping. As far as the International Olympic Committee 9 
(IOC) is concerned, the death of a cyclist at the 1960 Rome Olympics and the tragic 10 
passing of a British cyclist during the 1967 Tour de France sounded alarm bells about 11 
the need to tackle doping. A series of doping scandals led to the formation of the IOC 12 
Medical Commission, which began conducting drug tests at the Olympics (Wilson & 13 
Derse, 2000). However, as doping became rampant, the Commission found itself unable 14 
to tackle the problem on its own and calls for an anti-doping agency, independent of the 15 
IOC, were eventually answered in 1999 when the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) 16 
was established. However, as a non-governmental organization, WADA could only 17 
issue non-binding guidelines and had limited impact on nation states. To alter this 18 
situation, WADA began working with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 19 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the hope of exerting greater influence over 20 
national governments. With UNESCO’s support, WADA held the Second World 21 
Conference on Doping in Sport in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2003, when 73 countries 22 
signed the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport (Liu, 2003). The following 23 
year, WADA introduced the World Anti-Doping Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 24 
Code’)0F 1  (Houlihan, 2008), hoping to combat doping with the support of national 25 
governments, to ensure fairness in sport and to protect the health of athletes. Of course, 26 
doping was not exclusive to the Olympics. Many professional sports also fell victim to 27 
the use of performance enhancing drugs. In recent years, several high-profile athletes 28 
have been caught doping, including Major League Baseball player Barry Bonds, the 29 
American sprinter Justin Gatlin and seven-time Tour de France winner Lance 30 
Armstrong. In early 2016, Russian tennis star Maria Sharapova tested positive for 31 
meldonium at the Australian Open. This relatively minor scandal was followed by 32 
revelations that Russia had engaged in large-scale systematic doping, causing uproar 33 
among sports fans around the world. These incidents raise tantalizing questions: Why 34 
has WADA failed to control doping effectively since its inception? Could this be the 35 
consequence of governments’ unwillingness to comply with the Code? If so, what 36 
                                                     
1 Since its passage in 2003, the WADA Code has been renewed four times. The latest version 4.0 went 
into effect in January, 2015 (World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA], 2015b). 
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strategies have states adopted in response to the Code and what are the implications 1 
behind these strategies? By addressing these questions, we can acquire a better 2 
understanding of how the Code can be effectively implemented and whether doping 3 
can be eradicated, reduced to an acceptable level, or controlled at the present level. 4 
 5 
At present, most studies on sports doping focus on prohibited substances, 6 
prohibited methods or testing methods (Lombardi, Perego, Sansoni, & Banfi, 2016; 7 
Wang, Zhou, Liu, Dong, & Zhang, 2017), the use of prohibited substances and drug test 8 
adulterations (Antonopoulos & Hall, 2014; Maughan, 2007), ethical issues relating to 9 
athlete support personnel (Miah, 2006; Newsham & Mokha, 2017) and athlete privacy 10 
and human rights in doping control (Elbe & Overbye, 2014; Waddington & Møller, 11 
2014). Other researchers have examined WADA’s anti-doping policies and their 12 
effectiveness in doping control (Houlihan, 2004; Loland & Hoppeler, 2011; Stewart & 13 
Smith, 2004; Wagner, 2011) or the appropriateness of anti-doping policies (de Hon, 14 
2017; Efverström, Bäckström, Ahmadi, & Hoff, 2016; Malcolm & Waddington, 2008; 15 
Houlihan, 2015; Hunt, 2015). Also examined have been impact of the prohibited lists 16 
and the whereabouts requirements on athlete privacy and welfare (Henne, 2015; Sefiha 17 
& Reichman, 2016) and on athlete health and anti-doping education (Henning & Dimeo, 18 
2015; Mazanov, Huybers, & Connor, 2012). As shown above, research on sports doping, 19 
thus, mainly takes a microscopic view centred on athletes or their support personnel. 20 
Although some studies touch on the institutional and policy aspects of anti-doping, few 21 
examine compliance at a national level or from a governmental perspective. Among 22 
these, studies by Houlihan (2014) and Hanstad & Houlihan (2015) are the most relevant 23 
to the present study. Houlihan (2014) first looked at compliance from WADA and 24 
UNESCO perspectives, discussing how the two international bodies bring signatories 25 
into compliance. His main focus, however, was on the organization’s top-down 26 
governance and not the signatories’ response to WADA which is where this study places 27 
its emphasis. Furthermore, Houlihan (2014) only interviewed two officials from WADA 28 
and UNESCO and did not indicate any contact with officials from the signatory states. 29 
Understandably, the data collected through his interviews only comprise a small portion 30 
of his paper, the majority of which consists of a literature review. Nevertheless, 31 
Houlihan (2014) examined anti-doping policy by looking at compliance, which is an 32 
area of research worth pursuing. Hanstad and Houlihan (2015) later discussed how 33 
bilateral collaboration facilitates anti-doping, using the example of Norway, an anti-34 
doping role model, working with China, a repeated violator of international anti-doping 35 
rules. Although the paper sheds light on the interactive and cooperative relationship 36 
between China and Norway, its primary focus is limited to the anti-doping history of 37 
the two countries and their collaboration. Little is said about how the two countries 38 
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actually respond to the WADA Code. Although these two papers (Houlihan, 2014; 1 
Hanstad & Houlihan, 2015) were of value to us in terms of theoretical application and 2 
literature review, neither of them followed the same research direction as the present 3 
study.  4 
Previous scholars have discussed China’s compliance with the Code. For example, 5 
according to Yang and Leung (2008) and Fan and Lu (2012), following the doping 6 
scandals involving Chinese athletes at the 1994 Asian Games in Hiroshima and the 7 
1998 FINA World Championships, China began to take anti-doping seriously, hoping 8 
to restore its reputation and respond to growing international pressure. By that time, the 9 
doping crisis not only threatened to jeopardize Beijing’s chances of competing at 10 
Sydney 2000, it also appeared that China’s bid for the Beijing Games could be derailed 11 
(Fan & Lu, 2012, p. 140). Both studies went a step further by praising the Chinese 12 
government’s willingness to comply with WADA and revamping its anti-doping system. 13 
However, the limitations of both studies are evident. First, although Fan and Lu (2012) 14 
explained the impact of doping on China using historical accounts and attempted to 15 
delineate the evolution of China’s anti-doping policies, by adopting documentary 16 
analysis as their research method, they merely identified connections between related 17 
events without referring to the policy discourse of important stakeholders or to other 18 
policy documents. Yang and Leung (2008) pointed out that China achieved continued 19 
progress in relation to anti-doping. They based their argument on the fact that the 20 
Chinese swimming team passed all drug tests while winning multiple medals in 21 
international competitions in 2004. However, their study only cited official figures and 22 
media reports, their arguments being corroborated by field surveys. As a result, the 23 
findings did not offer a complete picture of China’s anti-doping policy. In addition, 24 
neither of the two studies used theories to inform their analysis and constantly ran the 25 
risk of being overly speculative. Lacking any theoretical basis and having failed to use 26 
field surveys as supporting documents, the two studies were unable to fully capture 27 
China’s anti-doping policy and the implications behind its compliance strategies. 28 
Therefore, the aim of the present study is to overcome the limitations of previous 29 
research by establishing a theoretical basis and by analyzing data collected from semi-30 
structured interviews. The authors of this study have sought to answer the following 31 
questions: (1) What were China’s strategies for managing compliance with the Code 32 
after 2004? (2) What were the main drivers and the significance of China’s compliance 33 
strategies? To answer these questions, this study is divided into two parts; the first 34 
examines China’s strategies for managing compliance with the Code and the second 35 
investigates the implications of these strategies. 36 
 37 
 38 
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Theoretical Framework and Research Methods  1 
    The analytical framework of the seven institutional factors for this study is based 2 
on Haas and Bilder’s (2003) ‘compliance theories’ used here for the purpose of 3 
scrutinizing China’s compliance strategies and their implications since signing up to 4 
the Code. The theoretical framework used specifically in the analysis of strategies and 5 
implications is as follows. 6 
    According to Haas and Bilder (2003), the international regime induces state actors 7 
to comply mainly through the following means: ‘monitoring’, ‘verification’, ‘horizontal 8 
linkages’, ‘nesting’, ‘capacity building’, ‘national concern’ and ‘institutional profile’. 9 
In ‘monitoring’, the regime demands that states honor their responsibilities and 10 
obligations, and inspectors oversee their compliance. In ‘verification’, the regime 11 
approves and certifies state compliance or empowers states to enforce anti-doping 12 
policies. ‘Horizontal linkages’ are connections built between organizations to help bring 13 
states into compliance. Enhanced interaction between organizations creates the 14 
collective momentum needed to encourage states to comply. ‘Nesting’ entails tying 15 
international norms to high-level issues to raise awareness. ‘Capacity building’ refers 16 
to the provision or withholding of resources as a means to encourage or force states 17 
‘National concern’ means raising awareness among social elites or the general public 18 
so that the issue receives greater attention. Finally, ‘institutional profile’ calls on 19 
regimes to strengthen their system or raise the level of discourse. In the context of this 20 
study, the WADA-led international regime seeks to bring states into compliance by 21 
implementing the Code.  22 
To satisfy the research aims of the study, the researchers designed an analytical 23 
framework based on the seven institutional factors identified by Haas and Bilder (2003). 24 
The result is a similar list of seven factors characterizing the WADA-led regime’s 25 
efforts in inducing states to comply. Based on the 2015 version of the WADA Code, we 26 
identified seven factors of compliance and with them developed our interview outline 27 
(see Table 1). By ‘monitoring’, the regime demands that states comply with the Code 28 
and push for necessary domestic legislation or amendments. By ‘verifying’, WADA 29 
accredits national anti-doping laboratories and certifies state compliance. By forging 30 
‘horizontal linkages’, WADA encourages cooperation between different anti-doping 31 
agencies. Through ‘nesting’, WADA stresses the importance of anti-doping on national 32 
agendas. ‘Capacity building’ helps expand states’ capacity to enforce anti-doping 33 
policies. By raising ‘national concern’, WADA calls for more public education about 34 
anti-doping control and an increase in the publicity for anti-doping issues through 35 
promotions. ‘Institutional profile’ calls for efforts to stimulate genuine interactions 36 
between states and international organizations, such as WADA, IOC and UNESCO. 37 
The purpose is to increase the level of attention paid by each state to anti-doping. As 38 
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shown above, this study has listed the factors which explain how WADA seeks to induce 1 
international and national sports bodies to comply. It has also described the 2 
responsibilities and obligations that WADA demands from signatories. These 3 
discussions helped determine the dimensions of our analysis and also helped us to 4 
prepare, in a more systematic fashion, an interview outline to be used for questions 5 
about ‘strategies’. The researchers conducted in-depth interviews with Chinese officials 6 
who have responsibility for devising China’s anti-doping policies (see table 2).  7 
 8 
Table 1 Interview outline (Seven factors of compliance with the WADA Code) 9 
Factors Interview questions (in brief) 
monitoring 1. What are the monitoring measures that WADA imposes on 
national anti-doping agencies (e.g. spot checks, inspection)? 
How does China respond to them? Why? 
2. Does non-compliance with WADA incur punishment? Have 
you considered not to comply with WADA? Do you comply 
with WADA out of fear for punishment? 
verification 1. Are you aware of the status of compliance of other states? Does 
their compliance (or your knowledge of their compliance) mean 
anything to China? 
2. Does China have any WADA accredited laboratories? What are 
their status? How are they funded?  
horizontal 
linkages 
1. What other agencies do you work with (e.g. Norwegian 
authorities)? What is the nature of your cooperation? Why do 
you cooperate? What is the status of your cooperation?  
2. Are domestic doping tests carried out externally by NADOs? 
What countries do you work with? Why those countries? What 
is the status of your cooperation?  
nesting 1. How do Chinese athletes gain membership of their respective 
sport associations? Are there any anti-doping requirements (e.g. 
signing contracts that contain anti-doping clause)? Do domestic 
sports events impose restrictions on participating athletes 
regarding anti-doping (e.g. demanding that athletes must sign 
anti-doping contract to compete)? Why do/don’t they have such 
requirements? 
2. Are there any anti-doping requirements for entering 
international sports bodies, participating in or bidding for sport 
events? How does China respond to those requirements? Why? 
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capacity 
building 
1. Do international sports bodies provide subsidies for anti-doping 
education? Are there other ways of obtaining resource for anti-
doping education or promotion? What actions has China taken? 
Why? 
2. What is the impact on funding if China fails to comply with the 
WADA Code? What actions have you taken to avoid this?  
national 
concern 
1. When investigating doping incidents, do you collaborate with 
national police agencies? How? What measures or actions have 
you taken? Why? What is the status of this collaboration (e.g. 
cooperative or confrontational)? 
2. On the issue of anti-doping, what educational measures have 
you taken domestically? How do you promote the concept of 
anti-doping? Why? 
institutional 
profile 
1. On anti-doping, how does China interact with UNESCO? What 
is the status of those interactions? What is the significance of 
UNESCO to China in terms of anti-doping?  
Source: Modified from Haas & Bilder (2003); WADA Code (2015) 1 
 2 
Our second aim was to understand the implications behind those strategies. On 3 
this matter, Haas and Bilder (2003) argued that the level of the compliance of state 4 
actors with international norms is decided by two factors: ‘willingness’ and ‘capacity’, 5 
i.e. how states’ ‘willingness’ to comply is influenced by the interest orientation and 6 
interaction of domestic stakeholders, and how their ‘capacity’ to comply is affected by 7 
the availability of resources. By combining ‘willingness’ and ‘capacity’ as factors 8 
affecting state compliance, Haas and Bilder concluded with several scenarios: costly 9 
compliance, low-cost compliance and non-compliance. They also analyzed the reasons 10 
behind each scenario. For example, if a state is willing and capable of bearing the cost 11 
of compliance, it may engage in either low-cost or costly compliance. On the contrary, 12 
if a state is incapable of carrying the cost, non-compliance or inability to comply may 13 
occur.  14 
    Following the above considerations, we adopted documentary analysis – a 15 
research tool in qualitative content analysis as our research method as we developed 16 
our analytical framework for a study of compliance. The researchers conducted semi-17 
structured interviews with Chinese officials handling anti-doping policies, including 18 
representatives of the General Administration of Sports of China (GAS), the China 19 
Anti-Doping Agency (CHINADA), the Chinese Swimming, Weightlifting, Football 20 
and Table Tennis Associations, administrators of Chinese Super League Football and 21 
scholars in related fields to seek answers to the two research questions. As regards 22 
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China’s strategies for managing compliance with the Code, the interviews helped us to 1 
examine how China responded to the seven institutional factors with which the 2 
international regime seeks to bring states into compliance. On the implications behind 3 
those strategies, the interviews focused on the dimensions of ‘capacity’ and ‘willingness’ 4 
to help determine whether state compliance or non-compliance was at play.  5 
 Arguably because of the political sensitivity of our research topic, access to 6 
interviews did not go smoothly. A lot of time was spent on networking. Fortunately, 7 
since 2006, the researchers have made multiple visits to China to investigate elite sports, 8 
including soccer, basketball, table tennis, gymnastics and swimming, and have 9 
established personal connections. For this study, by requesting repeated interviews and 10 
snowball sampling, and with the help of various associates, referrals were made to key 11 
sports personnel, including officials at GAS, CHINADA, individual sport associations, 12 
sport scholars and leading officials of China’s professional sports leagues. Through 13 
painstaking efforts, the researchers visited Beijing to conduct field research four times 14 
and interviewed a total of 22 policy makers, administrators or scholars who were 15 
directly or indirectly involved in China’s anti-doping policy (see table 2).  16 
 17 
Table 2 Profiles of interviewees 18 
Interviewee Affiliated organization/position Date of 
interview  
A The vice director of the Sports Ethics and 
Integrity Risk Research Center, Beijing Sports 
University 
2015.01.18 
B An official from the Athletic Sport 
Department, GAS 
2015.01.21 
2018.01.16 
C A leading official from the Chinese Table 
Tennis Association 
2015.01.21 
D A leading official from the Anti- Doping 
Division, Chinese Football Association (1) 
2015.08.07 
E A leading official from the Anti- Doping 
Division, Chinese Football Association (2) 
2015.08.08 
2018.01.19 
F A professor from the Research Center of the 
Olympic Movement, Beijing Sport University  
2015.08.09 
2018.01.22 
G An official of the Department of Science and 
Education [DSE], GAS 
2015.01.23 
2015.08.06 
2017.01.16 
2018.01.26 
H A leading official from CHINADA 2015.01.13 
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I An official from the Chinese Weightlifting 
Association 
2015.01.20 
2018.01.24 
J A scholar from Capital University of Physical 
Education and Sports  
2015.01.20 
K An official in the Division of Legal Affairs and 
Investigation, CHINADA 
2015.01.22 
L A WADA official 2015.02.02 
2018.01.28 
M A sport policy scholar from Beijing Sport 
University 
2015.07.28 
N A senior staff member of the Personnel 
Department, GAS (1) 
2015.07.30 
O A senior staff member of the Personnel 
Department, GAS (2) 
2015.07.30 
P A senior staff member of the Chinese 
Swimming Association 
2015.07.31 
2018.01.23 
Q A leading official from the Chinese Swimming 
Association (1) 
2015.08.07 
R A vice chairman of a Beijing professional 
football club  
2015.08.11 
S A leading official from CHINADA 2015.08.13 
T A former senior official in the Department of 
Science and Education [DSE], GAS 
2015.08.13 
2018.01.26 
U A leading official from the Chinese Swimming 
Association (2) 
2015.08.14 
V A former leader of the Chinese Football 
Association Super League Co., Ltd 
2015.08.15 
Additionally, when handling the interview data, the researchers were aware of the 1 
political sensitivity of the topic. Therefore, all interview data have been validated 2 
through triangulation before being cited in this paper. The data were compared against 3 
other interview data and original sources, including the organizations’ internal data, 4 
public documents and remarks of leading officials, to establish reliability. Both 5 
documentary and interview data were subjected to thematic analysis (Patton, 2002). 6 
Back translation was conducted to ensure linguistic consistency after the Chinese 7 
material was translated into English. 8 
 9 
Research Results and Discussion 10 
 11 
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1. China’s Strategies for Managing Compliance with the Code 1 
 2 
Starting in 1978, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping pushed for the ‘Four 3 
Modernizations’ with the goal of strengthening the fields of agriculture, industry, 4 
national defense, and science and technology. China introduced capitalist measures and 5 
hoped to swiftly boost its productivity (Oke, 1986). In the early 1980s, sports coaches 6 
and performance-enhancing drugs were brought into China from the Soviet Union and 7 
the German Democratic Republic in the interests of recruiting high-tech personnel and 8 
products (Interviewee K). Some officials of the State Sports Commission (now GAS), 9 
influenced by the apparently successful Soviet and East European sports culture, were 10 
of the opinion that ‘as long as it brings better sports results, poses no harm to athletes 11 
and goes undetected by international regulators, the use of performance-enhancing 12 
drugs is acceptable’. That comment was later interpreted as ‘the three principles of 13 
doping: useful, harmless and undetectable’ (Yuan, 2009, p. 23). In fact, China’s elite 14 
sports in the 1990s were heavily plagued by doping scandals. At the 1994 Asian Games 15 
in Hiroshima, 11 Chinese athletes tested positive for prohibited substances and were 16 
later stripped of all medals and banned for two years. At the 1998 FINA World 17 
Championships in Perth, Australia, Chinese swimmer Yuan Yuan was caught carrying 18 
human growth hormone and eventually disqualified. Another four Chinese swimmers 19 
failed drug tests later in the event (Sun, 2008; Yuan, 2009). As Chinese sports teams 20 
were implicated in one doping violation after another at international competitions, 21 
many in the West began to question China’s growing sports achievements. Some even 22 
categorically accused the Chinese government of supplying performance-enhancing 23 
drugs to its athletes. In 2002, the world witnessed an example of collective doping 24 
unfold at Shenyang Sport School, where school physicians administered the injection 25 
of prohibited substances on student athletes. It was the first doping scandal involving 26 
students on a campus (Fan & Lu, 2012). However, as doping in China gradually spread 27 
to a younger population, including even adolescents, the severity of the problem 28 
became clear. Another major impact was that non-complying signatories of WADA 29 
were barred from competing internationally and from hosting mega-sporting events 30 
(Interviewees G and J; see also the 2015 WADA Code 20.1.8, 20.3.11, 20.6.6 and 22.8). 31 
Facing an apparently never-ending wave of doping revelations, the Chinese government 32 
felt obliged to participate in the Second World Conference on Doping in Sport held by 33 
WADA in 2003 and committed itself to implementing the Code following the 34 
conference (Fan & Lu, 2012; Yang & Leaung, 2008). The following discussions dissect 35 
China’s strategies for managing compliance with the Code in line with the seven factors 36 
described in compliance theories, namely, monitoring, verification, horizontal linkages, 37 
nesting, capacity building, national concern and institutional profile. An analysis of 38 
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China’s strategies in relation to each of these factors will be presented separately.  1 
 2 
(1) Enactment and Amendments of Anti-Doping Regulations and Measures for 3 
the Administration of Anti-Doping in Response to the Code 4 
  5 
A succession of doping scandals at international competitions from the mid-1990s 6 
involving China escalated into diplomatic incidents. The Chinese leadership was under 7 
growing pressure to take doping seriously. It added Article 34 to the Sports Law, stating 8 
that ‘the use of prohibited substances and methods are strictly forbidden, and that drug 9 
testing institutions should strictly test against prohibited substances and methods’ 10 
(General Administration of Sport [GAS], 2000, p. 5). In 1998, GAS issued the Rules 11 
Prohibiting the Use of Banned Substances in Sports (Provisional) (Interviewee T). 12 
Although the document was swiftly publicised and the then Chinese leader Jiang Zemin 13 
publicly declared ‘China would rather not take gold medals than resort to doping’, the 14 
flow of doping scandals did not stop (Yuan, 2009, p. 20). To demonstrate its resolve to 15 
tackle doping, China committed itself to anti-doping campaign internationally, joining 16 
the newly-established WADA in 1999. As a response to WADA’s adoption of the Code 17 
in 2004, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao promulgated the Anti-Doping Regulations which 18 
not only provided a legal basis for China’s anti-doping policies, but also fulfilled the 19 
promise China had made to the IOC when winning the right to host the 2008 Olympics, 20 
i.e. prevent doping violations through legislation and other measures (Department of 21 
Education, Science, Technology, Culture and Health Legislations, State Council 22 
Legislative Affairs Office, GAS, 2004, p.20). Speaking to a seminar on the 23 
implementation of the Anti-Doping Regulations, GAS Director Yuan Weimin stressed 24 
that with the enactment of the Anti-doping Regulations, ‘the Chinese government has 25 
demonstrated to the world its solemn attitude and firm position on anti-doping, its 26 
support for the international anti-doping campaign and that the Chinese government 27 
and China’s sports circle have established a good image internationally’ (Yuan, 2004, 28 
p. 183). Officials from the GAS Department of Science and Education (DSE) 29 
emphasized that to be in line with the 2015 edition of the Code, the GAS established 30 
and implemented the Measures for the Administration of Anti-doping and the General 31 
Rules of Doping Control in 2015 to maintain a high level of compliance with the Code 32 
(Interviewee G). To ensure smooth implementation of the Code in China, DSE stressed 33 
in its internal documents that it would transform the 2015 edition of the Code into 34 
domestic law in the form of a regulatory document (i.e. the General Rules of Doping 35 
Control) and issue advisory guidelines on actual implementation to ensure, on a policy 36 
basis, that the new rules would be fully implemented (DSE, GAS, 2015). In addition, 37 
GAS also ensured that the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) and CHINADA 38 
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establish Anti-Doping Rules that corresponded to the Anti-Doping Regulations and 1 
submit these to WADA to fulfill China’s obligations in complying with the Code 2 
(Interviewees A, B, G). China’s approach was different from that of Norway, a country 3 
widely viewed as an anti-doping role model (Hanstad & Houlihan, 2015; Wagner & 4 
Hanstad, 2011). Although the Norwegian anti-doping agency is publicly funded and its 5 
leading officials directly appointed by the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic 6 
Committee, its operation is seen as having a high degree of autonomy. More notably, 7 
unlike Chinese legislation, Norwegian laws have not criminalized the use of 8 
performance-enhancing drugs.  9 
 10 
(2) Establishment of WADA-accredited Laboratories and Anti-Doping Centers 11 
 12 
In 1987, when Beijing secured the hosting rights for the 1990 Asian Games, the 13 
Chinese government prepared to set up an anti-doping laboratory. That task was handed 14 
to the National Research Institute of Sports Medicine, which had been founded in June 15 
of that year, under the State Sports Commission (SSC) (CHINADA, 2016). In 1992, 16 
the COC established the Anti-Doping Commission, naming the then Deputy Director 17 
of the SSC, Yuan Weimin, as its Chief. The DSE handled day-to-day affairs. 18 
Consequently, the drug testing laboratory, established under the aegis of the National 19 
Research Institute of Sports Medicine, was directly subordinate to the DSE (Zou, 2013, 20 
p. 29). In 1994, Lou Dapeng, Deputy Chief of the Department of Sports Training and 21 
Competition of SSC, was renamed Deputy Chief of the Anti-Doping Commission. 22 
Using his personal connections, Lou became acquainted with the Chief of the 23 
Department of Sport Policy, Ministry of Culture, Norway, who also served on the 24 
International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF). Thanks to the Norwegian 25 
official, Norway’s anti-doping laboratory assisted China in the establishment of an anti-26 
doping laboratory in Beijing in accordance with ISO9001, which later passed WADA’s 27 
accreditation (Interviewees F, J and T). The lab was created in preparation for the 2008 28 
Olympics and in response to pressure from WADA. However, in 2006, the German 29 
media accused the Chinese government of secretly performing gene doping on its 30 
athletes, who were expected to win gold medals at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The 31 
report ridiculed the Beijing Olympics as being hosted by a doping country – an 32 
observation shared by the then WADA President Dick Pound, who in turn sought 33 
explanations from the Chinese authorities. Mounting pressure from the international 34 
media and the WADA President was treated with utmost urgency by the Chinese 35 
leadership, who instructed the relevant authorities to clarify the situation. According to 36 
one DSE official, ‘to clear up the misunderstanding, we immediately invited the WADA 37 
President to inspect our anti-doping efforts and urged the State Council to form a 38 
13 
 
national anti-doping center’ (Interviewee G). The official pointed out that immediately 1 
after visiting China’s anti-doping facilities, the WADA President voluntarily stamped 2 
out doping rumors about China at an international press conference, publicly praising 3 
China ‘as a role model in anti-doping’. Following this incident, the State Council agreed 4 
to establish an anti-doping center (CHINADA) under GAS and reorganize the national 5 
anti-doping laboratory under its auspices (CHINADA, 2016). However, CHINADA did 6 
not operate independently from the Chinese government. In fact, CHINADA was still 7 
under the control of GAS, being particularly dependent on DSE policies. In April 2014, 8 
the DSE even created an anti-doping division to help implement the 2015 edition of the 9 
Code and handle anti-doping affairs, which had become increasingly specialized (GAS, 10 
2015). Although CHINADA wanted to and should be independent, the reality is that 11 
under China’s current development patterns, most agencies are still directly controlled 12 
by the government. Anti-doping laboratories, in particular, need funding support and 13 
can hardly operate independently from the government. Even some WADA officials 14 
admit that it is understandable for CHINADA to receive large sums of funding from the 15 
government (Interviewee L). Our data also show that the Chinese government paid 16 
considerable attention to the running of CHINADA because it could affect the national 17 
image and China’s credentials to host mega-sporting events. Therefore, the government 18 
invests heavily in CHINADA in the hope of gaining recognition from the IOC and 19 
WADA (Interviewees G, H, S and T). It is also worth noting that China’s anti-doping 20 
tasks are led by the newly-established anti-doping division of the DSE, GAS, and not 21 
by any elements of the elite sport sector. This helps to maintain a separation of powers 22 
among the departments to avoid conflicts of interest. The addition of an anti-doping 23 
division under GAS, considered rare at a time when China was downsizing its sports 24 
administrative system (Interviewees G, J and M), reflected how much emphasis the 25 
Chinese government put on anti-doping. In addition, during the interviews, two leading 26 
officials from CHINADA revealed their desire to unshackle themselves from GAS, 27 
operating as a non-profit organization completely independent from government 28 
(Interviewees H, S). However, in April 2016, four months prior to the Rio Olympics, 29 
an anti-doping lab under CHINADA was hit with a four-month suspension as it had 30 
failed WADA’s blind tests (accreditation already reinstated by the end of August, 2016) 31 
(WADA, 2016). Later, when 31 Chinese athletes from the Beijing Olympics tested 32 
positive for prohibited substances upon retesting, the management problem of 33 
CHINADA was completely exposed (Interviewee G). The latest scandal disgraced the 34 
Chinese leadership, prompting the government to reshuffle the leadership of 35 
CHINADA. In addition to renaming Chen Zhiyu, Deputy Chief of DSE handling anti-36 
doping affairs, as the new Deputy Director of CHINADA (GAS, 2017), the government 37 
also designated Li Yingchuan, Assistant to GAS Director at the time, as Director of 38 
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CHINADA concurrently. The purpose was to strengthen China’s anti-doping 1 
administration to facilitate anti-doping operations for the 2022 Winter Olympics in 2 
Beijing. In addition, a senior official from the DSE, GAS also emphasized that‘we are 3 
preparing to set up a second anti-doping laboratory aiming to pass WADA’s 4 
accreditation for the 2022 Winter Olympics and to demonstrate our commitment with 5 
the Code (Interviewee T).  6 
 7 
(3) Seeking International Cooperation in Anti-Doping 8 
 9 
Following the scandals at the 1994 Asian Games, during which several Chinese 10 
athletes in swimming, track and field and cycling were caught doping (Department of 11 
Education, Science, Technology, Culture and Health Legislations, 2004), the Chinese 12 
government actively sought cooperation with overseas anti-doping agencies. It signed 13 
bilateral agreements with countries such as Australia, Canada, Norway and Sweden to 14 
promote collaboration and exchange, and also launched exchange activities with France, 15 
the UK, etc. Through mutual visits of personnel, information exchange, operations 16 
evaluation and collaborative research with other countries, China hoped to bolster its 17 
anti-doping efforts (Interviewee S). Among the many overseas partners, Australia and 18 
Norway have been the closest to China. Australia was an advanced country in the 19 
world’s anti-doping community and had won the right to host the 2000 Olympics. It 20 
was among the first countries to contact China, hoping to initiate bilateral exchange on 21 
anti-doping. Initially, China hesitated, but soon felt isolated and helpless in light of the 22 
1994 doping scandals and desperately needed help from the outside. In these 23 
circumstances, China signed a formal agreement with Australia to begin annual 24 
exchanges. Although the bilateral exchange program ended after the Sydney Olympics 25 
due to Australia’s lack of funding, it paved the way for the current reciprocal testing 26 
between the two countries (Interviewee H). In an interview, a former DSE official 27 
pointed out: While the exchange agreement was partly motivated by Australia’s desire 28 
to monitor Chinese athletes against doping and ensure fair play at the Sydney Games, 29 
it nevertheless boosted China’s anti-doping development to a certain extent 30 
(Interviewee T). 31 
As for China’s collaboration with Norway, the two countries have maintained 32 
close ties between their anti-doping laboratories since the 1990s. After the 2008 33 
Olympics, China ran neck-and-neck with Norway in terms of drug-testing capabilities. 34 
WADA President Dick Pound even publicly praised China for playing a leading role in 35 
anti-doping following the Olympics. CHINADA officials believed that WADA deemed 36 
China and Norway to be top performers in anti-doping and therefore called on the two 37 
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countries to collaborate in helping Kenya to establish its anti-doping agency. ‘It was a 1 
way of recognizing China’s anti-doping achievements by WADA, but also an export 2 
and manifestation of China’s soft power’ (Interviewees K, L), one CHINADA official 3 
said, ‘To be frank, the three WADA assistance programs currently underway around the 4 
world, namely, Canada assisting Jamaica, the US and the UK helping Brazil, China and 5 
Norway supporting Kenya, are all examples of “good students leading bad students”’ 6 
(Interviewee K). 7 
 8 
(4) Promoting the Special and Important Role of Anti-Doping Issues among 9 
Domestic Sports Bodies 10 
 11 
According to a former senior DSE official, change in China’s anti-doping policy 12 
was often associated with international events and major doping scandals. A particular 13 
case in point was the scandal at the 1998 FINA World Championships in Perth, 14 
Australia (Interviewee T), after which the Chinese leader Jiang Zemin declared 15 
unequivocally to China’s sports circle, ‘[China] would rather not take gold medals than 16 
resort to doping’ (Yuan, 2004, p. 183). Jiang made this statement to ease growing 17 
international pressure. But for Yuan Weimin, the newly appointed GAS Director, the 18 
pressure of having responsibility for China’s success at the upcoming Sydney Games 19 
was enormous. In his memoir, Yuan stated, ‘I was under huge pressure! Among the 20 
athletes who failed GAS random drug tests and thereby lost the chance to compete in 21 
Sydney, several could have won gold medals. If someone was caught doping, I took the 22 
blame. If athletes didn’t perform well, I took the blame. If Beijing’s Olympic bid was 23 
compromised due to doping, I would be given an extra “charge”’ (Yuan, 2004, p. 30). 24 
In fact, as Yuan said, ‘the problem of doping concerns national pride and the image of 25 
Chinese athletes. It is a “political” issue. It affected Beijing’s bid for the Olympics. 26 
GAS must raise the banner of anti-doping and must not waver’ (Yuan, 2004, p.22). As 27 
doping escalated into a ‘political’ issue, anti-doping began to play a special and 28 
important role in China’s sports administration. It became obligatory for every sport 29 
governing body under the GAS to designate one deputy chief to anti-doping duties 30 
(Interviewees M, R and V). In addition, to ensure the cleanness of the Chinese national 31 
athletes competing abroad, the authorities strengthened the control and screening of 32 
athletes’ food intakes, dietary supplements and medication. More importantly, athletes 33 
now had to pass CHINADA’s drug screening before competing overseas (Interviewee 34 
I). 35 
 36 
(5) Securing Funding for Domestic Anti-Doping Operations 37 
 38 
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China’s anti-doping policies are mainly formulated by the Anti-Doping Division 1 
of DSE and GAS and are primarily implemented by CHINADA. Under the direct 2 
supervision of GAS, CHINADA is a public-sector organization fully funded by the 3 
government. Administratively, it runs like any other government agency and is headed 4 
by a Director directly appointed by GAS (Zou, 2013, p. 38). According to one of its 5 
leading officials, CHINADA’s operating expenses, including utilities, equipment, 6 
refurbishment and personnel costs, are fully funded by the government. Every year, the 7 
government allocates special funds to CHINADA for drug screening and anti-doping 8 
education (Interviewee H). The official added, ‘when we began in 1990, we tested a 9 
little more than 160 samples. The numbers have gone up to about 8000 samples every 10 
year. These tests were all funded by the government’. To ensure national athletes were 11 
doping-free, all first-string and second-string members of Chinese national teams, 12 
which amounted to more than 4000 athletes, were gathered and tested. According to 13 
some officials from individual sport associations, the national weightlifting team was 14 
tested most frequently, at an interval of once per week. Coming next were the swimming 15 
and track and field teams which were tested once or twice per month (Interviewees I, P, 16 
Q, U). This supports the GAS official’s suggestion that China has stepped up anti-17 
doping and now conducts multiple tests each month (Interviewee G). Meanwhile, 18 
screenings seemed to be cascading down from the elite sports system, to cover sports 19 
schools at the provincial level. A GAS official revealed, ‘by doing so, we can ensure 20 
that student athletes do not dope, and that our national teams are safe’ (Interviewee H). 21 
Testing expenses for preparation for the Olympics are met with additional funding. The 22 
official stressed, ‘to ensure that no Chinese athletes competing overseas generate any 23 
negative news, we spent an additional 10 million yuan just for the 2012 London 24 
Olympics alone’. Understandably, drug test funding for the 2016 Rio Olympics was 25 
inevitably higher. Due to the enormous costs of drug tests, in addition to the 8000 26 
samples funded by the central government each year, GAS is developing a system of 27 
bottom-up supervision. It holds provincial and municipal governments responsible for 28 
the costs of testing their athletes in order to expand the scope of screening (Interviewees 29 
G, H). According to the DSE official, ‘Anti-doping is gaining a lot of momentum in 30 
China with the leadership’s backing. In particular, this coincides with China’s bid for 31 
the 2022 Winter Olympics, so we are expecting a great leap forward’ (Interviewee G). 32 
To cope with the expansion of test subjects (including sports school test takers, elite 33 
athletes and professional athletes) and growing drug test expenses, GAS reached an 34 
agreement with Shanghai city government to establish China’s second anti-doping 35 
laboratory funded by the city government. As well as carrying out more drug tests on 36 
professional athletes, the new laboratory would also perform drug tests during 37 
admission exams for college-level sports training programs with full funding from the 38 
17 
 
Ministry of Education (Interviewee G). Eventually China’s second anti-doping 1 
laboratory was established in Shanghai city on 3rd April, 2018 (Zhu & Gao, 2018). 2 
 3 
(6) Making Anti-Doping Commitment an Entry Criterion for National Sports 4 
Teams as a Measure to Promote Anti-Doping Education 5 
 6 
When Yuan Weimin took the helm of GAS in the late 1990s, GAS began 7 
demanding that athletes, coaches, sport administrative centers and sports event 8 
organizers sign an anti-doping commitment statement, which later evolved into a 9 
twofold system: an anti-doping commitment statement signed by sports administrative 10 
bodies and the athletes’ commitment to anti-doping as an entry criterion for national 11 
teams. In the Notice on Chinese Delegation’s Anti-doping Work at Multi-sport Events 12 
in 2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Notice’), it is stressed that ‘GAS will sign a 13 
Responsibility Statement of the Chinese Delegation’s Commitment to Anti-doping, 14 
Sports Culture and Sports Ethics with pertinent sports authorities and enact the “Rules 15 
regarding Anti-doping and Medical Work for the Chinese Delegation”, clearly 16 
designating the leading official of each sports body as the person in charge of its anti-17 
doping responsibilities and that the team leaders are directly responsible for their team’s 18 
anti-doping work’ (DSE, GAS, 2013). Simply put, when dividing administrative 19 
responsibilities for anti-doping, GAS is holding the leading officials of sports bodies 20 
directly responsible. According to the GAS officials, if a doping incident occurs, those 21 
leading officials who have signed a commitment statement would not only be severely 22 
punished but would also be likely to be excluded from any promotion in the future. This 23 
is because the national leadership takes anti-doping very seriously (Interviewees G, N, 24 
O). 25 
On making an anti-doping commitment a criterion for entering national teams, the 26 
Notice dictates ‘[we] need to uphold the principle of “prevention first, education as 27 
fundamental”. Prior to every sports event, all pertinent authorities must mobilize their 28 
athletes and support personnel to study anti-doping knowledge, take joint exams and 29 
sign anti-doping statements. Athletes and support personnel must attend classes and 30 
pass exams as demanded to qualify for the Chinese delegation’. The Notice also 31 
emphasizes, ‘pertinent authorities should designate personnel to be in charge of these 32 
affairs, fully implementing anti-doping education, examination, signing of anti-doping 33 
statements and promotion. They should utilize this system as an effective measure to 34 
strengthen anti-doping education and must not treat it perfunctorily or simply as a 35 
matter of formality’ (DSE, GAS, 2013). Interviews with China’s swimming, 36 
weightlifting, track and field, table tennis and football associations revealed that the 37 
anti-doping entry criterion has now been fully adopted in the selection of national 38 
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athletes in these sports (Interviewees C, D, E, P, Q and U). An official from the Chinese 1 
Weightlifting Association pointed out, ‘all weightlifters and their coaches must attend 2 
anti-doping classes, pass exams and re-sign a commitment statement before they can 3 
compete abroad’ (Interviewee I). The official admitted that the entry criterion has 4 
greater declaratory significance than actual effects. Nevertheless, he stressed, ‘after 5 
signing the commitment statement, those who violate the rules shall take punishment 6 
voluntarily’. In other words, the system deters and prevents athletes and coaches from 7 
violating anti-doping rules. 8 
Additionally, to ensure the fairness of the admission exams for college-level sports 9 
programs, China has begun running drug test sites for examinees; these are fully funded 10 
by the Ministry of Education, supervised by the DSE and implemented by CHINADA 11 
and the school authorities (DSE, GAS, 2014). According to the DSE official, the test 12 
sites were set up due to growing concerns on the part of central government and 13 
education officials following several incidents in which examinees died during skill 14 
tests due to doping (Interviewees G, T). 15 
 16 
(7) Maintaining Good Relations with WADA, IOC and UNESCO 17 
 18 
In 1997, China began participating in the Monitoring Group of the Anti-Doping 19 
Convention as an observer. Since WADA’s formation in 1999, as a major Asian country, 20 
China has been represented on WADA’s foundation board by a GAS Deputy Director 21 
who manages China’s elite sports (GAS, 2015, p. 18). Furthermore, the Chinese 22 
government sets aside 240,000 US dollars annually for funding WADA’s operations 23 
(Interviewees H, S). It should be noted again that WADA’s founding President Dick 24 
Pound spoke highly of China’s anti-doping organizations after his inspection tours in 25 
China in 2007. Ironically, however, following the Beijing Olympics, the then WADA 26 
President John Fahey and Director General David Howman said publicly in 2013 that 27 
China produced 99% of the world’s illegal substances (Sun, 2013). This claim 28 
disgruntled the Chinese leadership, even prompting the then GAS Deputy Director 29 
Duan Shijie, who served on the WADA Foundation Board at the time, to lodge a protest 30 
in writing (Duan, 2013). Despite the row, the incident eventually led to cooperation 31 
between China and WADA, combating the production, selling and trade of illegal 32 
substances (WADA, 2015a). Howman believed this was ‘a step forward in 33 
collaboration’ between China and WADA (Ma, 2015). A GAS official also pointed out 34 
that the WADA-China relationship is at its best stage of constructive interaction 35 
wherein both sides support and understand the work that needs to be done. As a great 36 
power but also a major producer of raw materials for illegal substances, China needs to 37 
close the loophole (Interviewee G).  38 
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 1 
During the 2014 Nanjing Youth Olympics, Liu Yandong, a Chinese Politburo 2 
member and Vice Premier, met with WADA’s newly-elected President and IOC Vice 3 
President Sir Craig Reedie, assuring him of the Chinese government’s full support for 4 
Agenda 2020, an anti-doping strategic roadmap proposed by IOC Chairman Thomas 5 
Bach. Like Japan, China pledged one million US dollars to the IOC Anti-doping 6 
Research Fund to strengthen its collaboration with the IOC (GAS, 2015, p.34). 7 
Furthermore, in 2005, China was among the first countries to sign the UNESCO-8 
initiated International Convention against Doping in Sport as a move to recognize the 9 
effectiveness of the Code. According to a leading official of CHINADA, China 10 
regularly sends representatives to attend UNESCO-held Convention meetings and 11 
serve vice chairmen at the Convention’s executive committee. It also donates annually 12 
to UNESCO-affiliated foundations, which provides funding to countries to start their 13 
anti-doping programs (Interviewee H). 14 
 15 
 16 
2. The Main Drivers and the Significance of China’s Compliance Strategies 17 
 18 
 From the above analysis of the seven dimensions of China’s compliance strategies, 19 
which was based on the seven dimensions identified in compliance theories, one can 20 
infer that China’s signing of the Code and its compliance were driven by both external 21 
and internal factors. Externally, it was mainly motivated by the international realities of 22 
the time and especially by the fact that Chinese athletes were to compete with athletes 23 
from other countries (Interviewees A, G, T). From the 1980s to early 1990s, China’s 24 
officials were heavily influenced by Soviet and East European sports culture and did 25 
not believe doping was wrong. On the contrary, China saw doping as an application of 26 
high-tech products, leading to the three principles of doping: usefulness, harmlessness 27 
and undetectability. That thinking was increasingly challenged when the IOC and the 28 
European Union began to address the threat of doping and the issue of fairness in sports 29 
competitions. A wind of change blew through the international community as more and 30 
more countries came to believe that sending doping athletes to compete was deceitful, 31 
unethical and seriously violated the IOC’s firmly held principle of fair play. As the IOC 32 
toughened anti-doping drug tests and worldwide public opinion began to notice and 33 
condemn doping countries and athletes, China found itself in the storm center of a series 34 
of doping scandals in the late 1990s when Chinese athletes competing abroad were 35 
caught doping collectively. Those incidents were viewed as international scandals 36 
involving state-directed systematic doping in order to give athletes an unfair advantage 37 
over others. The severity of the scandals led to diplomatic incidents, tainting China’s 38 
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image and reputation in the world. International pressure forced the then Chinese leader 1 
Jiang Zemin to publicly declare that China’s sports community ‘would rather not take 2 
gold medals than resort to doping’ (Yuan, 2009, p. 20). The cost of taking the anti-3 
doping path for China was enormous, not least because it could undermine the country’s 4 
performance in international competition. However, China was capable of choosing to 5 
comply with the IOC’s anti-doping policy at the time and with the Code that followed. 6 
It should be noted that China’s strength and performance in elite sports did not decline 7 
significantly as a consequence of its anti-doping efforts. In fact, at the 2008 Beijing 8 
Olympics, China overtook the United States to top the medal table and became the new 9 
superpower in sports. Even at the 2012 London Olympics, Chinese athletes finished 10 
with their best performance at an Olympics held outside of China.  11 
 The internal drivers for China’s compliance can be linked to China’s status as a 12 
bidder and/or host of international sports events and as a rising power. Bidding for and 13 
hosting sports mega-events, especially the Summer and Winter Olympics, had been 14 
China’s century-old dream. By hosting the Olympics, China hoped to remove the 15 
stigma of ‘the sick man of East Asia’ that had haunted people since the Opium Wars in 16 
the mid-19th century. For this reason, anything that could potentially derail China’s 17 
Olympics bidding or hosting prospects had to be eradicated. It is unsurprising that 18 
former GAS Director Yuan Weimin called doping a ‘political’ problem, since doping 19 
could have jeopardized Beijing’s 2008 Olympic bid and China was obliged to carry the 20 
anti-doping banner. In its response to the IOC and the Code, China was clearly aware 21 
of the great cost involved in compliance. In particular, the response called for regulatory 22 
changes, the establishment of anti-doping institutions, and large subsidies and input of 23 
manpower from the central government. Despite the high cost, however, China has 24 
gradually displayed its strength as a great power with the successful hosting of the 2008 25 
Beijing Olympics and winning the bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics. Furthermore, 26 
after becoming leader of China, President Xi Jinping unveiled the China Dream, which 27 
called on the country to ascend from being a sporting power to a sporting superpower 28 
(Tan, & Houlihan, 2013; Tan, Huang, Bairner & Chen, 2016). While treating sport as a 29 
platform upon which to demonstrate and export its culture and use soft power, China 30 
spared no effort to demand a clean image from its athletes, safeguard its national 31 
reputation and pursue the China Dream of becoming a sporting superpower. In 32 
complying with the Code, China has shown zero tolerance for mistakes despite the 33 
enormous cost. 34 
 35 
Conclusion 36 
 37 
    In terms of compliance strategies, China has responded to the international anti-38 
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doping regime in each of these seven dimensions separately: monitoring, verification, 1 
horizontal linkages, nesting, capacity building, national concern and institutional 2 
profile. In monitoring, China has enacted and amended the Anti-doping Regulations 3 
and the Measures for the Administration of Anti-doping in accordance with the 2015 4 
edition of the Code. In terms of Verification, China is set to establish its second WADA-5 
accredited laboratory in Shanghai after Beijing’s. As regards creating horizontal 6 
linkages, China has collaborated closely with Norway and has assisted Kenya by 7 
providing technical training and guidance for its anti-doping institution. With reference 8 
to nesting, China has demanded that Chinese athletes, coaches, sports administrative 9 
centers and sports event organizers sign an ‘anti-doping commitment statement’. In the 10 
interests of capacity building, the Chinese government has not only provided full 11 
funding support to domestic anti-doping campaigns but has also donated one million 12 
US dollars to the IOC Anti-Doping Research Fund, which has worked closely with 13 
WADA. By raising national concern, the Chinese government has developed anti-14 
doping teaching materials, provided anti-doping education and set up drug test sites for 15 
sports school test takers. Finally, by strengthening its institutional profile, China has 16 
actively participated in UNESCO events and was one of the initiators of the 17 
International Convention against Doping in Sport.  18 
China’s signing of and compliance with the Code were driven by a combination 19 
of external and internal factors. Externally, these actions were linked to China’s doping 20 
scandals in the 1990s, media exposure and diplomatic pressure that came with the 21 
scandals, and the fear that Chinese athletes could be barred from competing at the 22 
Olympics. Internally, China was influenced by its desire to bid for Winter and Summer 23 
Olympics. The implication of China’s compliance is that the Chinese government has 24 
attained a level of compliance in terms of willingness and capability. Houlihan (2014) 25 
and Hanstad & Houlihan (2015), who have long paid attention to anti-doping policy, 26 
point out that the level of ‘commitment’ to compliance cannot be easily measured. 27 
However, our evidence suggests that China is willing to pay a high price to comply with 28 
the Code. This study, thus, concludes that if the Chinese leadership continues to believe 29 
that participation in, bidding for and hosting mega-sporting events (especially the 30 
Olympics) are important to the country’s development, China will continue to pay a 31 
high price to comply with the Code. In terms of theoretical applicability, this study 32 
shows that, in the WADA Code, the provisions relating to compliance can be 33 
categorized as comprising seven factors, and that the response strategies of national 34 
agencies can also be broken into seven factors. More importantly, our theoretical 35 
framework helps us understand how international organizations bring national agencies 36 
into compliance, and how states respond to the seven factors of compliance. This 37 
confirms Robert K. Yin’s claim that ‘articulating “theory” about what is being studied 38 
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helps to operationalize case study designs and make them more explicit’ (Yin, 2003: 1 
19).  2 
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